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1. Introduction 
In the last decade Italian and European labour markets have been characterized 
by a strong increase of temporary employment and the recent approval of the 
“Biagi Law”1 is often assumed to be a factor to boost temporary work in Italy. 
Referring to some theoretical frameworks, we could look at this situation in terms 
of a “contractual exchange”2. In this manner workers (or trade unions) could 
accept more precariousness in exchange for higher employment rates3. 
Nevertheless a number of empirical researches show that, since allowing for more 
temporary jobs to be created entails an increase in both job creation and job 
destruction, the effects on total employment are uncertain4. In any case, even if we 
believed that more precariousness involves higher employment rates, another very 
important question would emerge, that is: how long are people going to spend in 
precarious jobs?In effect the recent evolution of labour markets induced many 
economists to investigate the nature of temporary work, and one of the most 
                                                 
* Department of Public Economics, University of Rome, “La Sapienza”. I wish to thank M. 
Capparucci, M. Franzini, S. Scicchitano, S. Staffolani, the participants of the International 
Conference on “Social Pacts, Employment and Growth: A Reappraisal of Ezio Tarantelli’s 
Thought (Rome, 31 March - 1 April 2005), the participants of the XX AIEL Conference of 
Labour Economics (Rome, 22-23 September 2005), and three anonymous referees for 
providing helpful comments on earlier version of this paper. Usual disclaimers apply. 
1 . Legislative Decree n. 276/2003. 
2 . See, for example, Tarantelli, 1986. 
3 . Saint Paul, 2004. 
4 . Blanchard, Landier, 2001. 
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important question to answer has been: can temporary jobs serve as “stepping 
stones” to enter stable employment or do they represent “dead-end jobs”?5  On the 
one hand, temporary contracts should help the unemployed to get (back) into 
employment and to find a stable job, by reducing unemployment spells, the risks of 
long-run unemployment, and by preserving/improving their human capital through 
on the job experience. In this case temporary contracts would be a way to select the 
future permanent employees6. On the other hand, it has been argued that, if 
temporary work is characterized by worse monetary and non-monetary conditions 
than stable jobs, and if flexible firms adopt a segmentation of the workforce into a 
“core” of stable jobs and a “periphery” of temporary workers, then dual labour 
markets may arise and precariousness may become a “trap”7. In any case, the 
variables involved in this phenomenon seem to be very complex and, as far as 
other theoretical contributions8 are concerned, in this paper I intend to focus upon 
the influence of learning processes, human capital accumulation9 and 
unemployment rates at local level.  In particular, to highlight the influence of these 
variables on the probability of escaping from the temporary work “trap” and on the 
intensity of transition to permanent employment, after developing a simple 
theoretical model, a discrete time duration model with gamma-distributed 
unobserved heterogeneity, based on ECHP data for Italian regions (1995-2001), 
will be estimated. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple 
theoretical model in which the intensity of transition between precarious and stable 
jobs depends on individual human capital and unemployment rates at regional 
                                                 
5 . Booth et al., 2002. 
6 . Storrie, 2002; Erickcek, Houseman, Kalleberg, 2003. 
7 . Lindbeck, Snower, 1988, 1990; Saint Paul, 1996. 
8  . Snower, 1996; Pappadà, 2003. 
9 . The role of heterogeneous human capital (education, training, and work experience) in a 
flexible labour market has even brought out by Biagi (2001), when he wrote “working time 
is signed by cycles of dependent and independent jobs...and within them, some training 
periods should be”. 
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level; section 3 illustrates the steps of my empirical analysis; section 4 presents the 
econometric model I used; section 5 is devoted to the empirical estimates and the 
discussion of the main results. Some concluding remarks and policy implications 
follow. 
 
2. Training and the probability of transition to permanent employment: 
the influence of educational levels and unemployment rates 
I consider an economy with heterogeneous labour force and a given 
number of firms, which are assumed to be identical. Firms always hire 
workers on short-term contracts, thereby incurring into hiring costs. If 
workers have a suitable level of education, the firm offers them training and 
confirms them on the expiry of the contract. Otherwise the firm dismisses 
the workers at the end of their fixed-term contract, without incurring into 
firing costs, and replaces them with new entrants. All the new entrants in the 
first period, t=0, are employed on fixed term contracts and their wage is a 
negative function of unemployment:  
( )uww =0          with:   ( ) 0' <uw    and   ( ) 0" >uw  
In  t=0  workers’ productivity, ηi ,  depends on their educational level, Ei: 
( )ii Eη    with    ( ) 0' >Eη    and    ( ) 0" <Eη  
I assume [ ]−+∈ ηηη ;i ; where +η  and −η  are, respectively, the maximum 
and minimum value of η. η has a distribution function ( )ηF , where 
( ) ( )hprobhF <= η . As ηi depends directly on the educational level, it is 
perfectly observed by the firms. If the educational level of a worker is high 
enough, that is, if: ( ) ( )** EEii ηη ≥ , the firm will offer him/her training and, 
then, will confirm this worker with a permanent contract in the second 
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period (t=1). Trained workers’ productivity in the second period is10 
ii ηαη > , and their wage, ( )1iw , is the outcome of a Nash bargain between 
the firm and each of its trained-permanent employees. In this case the firm 
has to take into account the presence of firing costs, which are assumed to 
be a proportion φ  of the permanent workers’ wage11 ( )1iw :  ( )1iwF ⋅= φ . On 
the contrary, if the worker’s level of education is not high enough, the firm 
will not offer training and will not confirm him/her at the end of the first 
period. Not confirmed workers can find another precarious job with wage 
( ) iv η1 , which take into account their experience on the job. I assume 
( ) ( ) ( )11 ii wvuw << η . 
The wages bargaining 
The Nash bargaining problem12, between the firm and its trained-
permanent workers, to solve at the beginning of the second period is: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]ββ ηφαη iiii vww 1111 1 −⋅+⋅− −    
where  β is the worker’s bargaining power, with 10 ≤≤ β .  From the first 
order conditions of the previous maximization problem I obtain the 
negotiated wage13: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]φ
φβαβη
+
⋅+−+=
1
111
1
v
w ii                                                 [1] 
                                                 
10 . Obviously, 1>α . α could also be considered individual-variant. In this case: 1>iα . 
11.  See Nunziata, Staffolani, 2001. 
12 . See Muthoo A., 1999. 
13 . Note that: ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
0
1
111 >+
⋅+−=∂
∂
φ
φαη
β
vw ii       if       ( ) ( )11 v⋅+> φα   and:  
( )
( ) 01
1
2
<
+
−=∂
∂
φ
βαη
φ
iiw  
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The firm  
The firm has to decide whether or not to offer training and confirm a 
worker, by comparing his expected gain in case of training with the 
expected gain without training. In case of training the workers’ productivity 
raises, but wages and firing costs raise as well. Without training, the firm 
dismisses the workers and replaces them with new entrants, characterised by 
the same productivity, iη , and the same wage, ( )uw . In this case the firm 
holds some hiring costs, H. I assume ( ) ( )uwHuw ⋅=+ ω . For the sake of 
simplicity the trained workers, with a permanent contract, do not quit the 
firm until retirement. The following condition must be satisfied: 
( )[ ] ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]φαηωηωη +⋅−+⋅−−≤⋅− 112 iiii wuwcuw                [2]                                      
where ci −η  is the productivity of  a worker in training in the first period. 
By substituting [1] in [2] I obtain: 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) Rv
uwc
i ≡−+−−−
⋅−≥
11111 φββα
ωη                                               [3]                                     
where R is the minimum level of education for investment in training to be 
profitable for the firm. It is easy to see that the higher is the unemployment 
rate, the higher will be the threshold R.  
The workers 
The worker accepts to be trained and confirmed by the firm if: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11 ii wuwvuw +≤+ η     that is if:         ( ) ( )11 ii wv ≤η                   [4]                                     
which is always satisfied, since I assumed14: ( ) ( ) ( )11 ii wvuw << η . 
                                                 
14 . In any case, by substituting  [1] in [4] I obtain:  ( ) ( )( ) ( )φ
φβαβ
+≤
⋅+−+
1
1 111 vv  which is 
always satisfied. 
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From [1] – [4] I can infer that the proportion of workers in training in the 
first period, and confirmed on the basis of a permanent contract in the 
second period, is:     ( ) ( )RprobRF i ≥=− η1 . This proportion is an increasing 
function of the average human capital and of the unemployment rates at 
local level. Thus, the firms prefer to offer training and confirm with a 
permanent contract those workers that have a high level of education. 
Nevertheless the threshold, R, in not a constant, but a positive function of 
the unemployment rate. In this case the probability of transition from a 
precarious/temporary job to a stable one does not solely depend on the 
workers’ individual human capital. The conditions of labour markets at local 
level also matter. This result is consistent with the following empirical 
analysis. 
 
3. The steps of the empirical analysis 
In the economic literature there is no conclusive evidence about the 
effects of the incidence of temporary contracts on the occupational 
performances of the labour markets. In this case it becomes more and more 
important to try to understand if temporary employment can be useful to 
enter stable occupation or if it could generate a vicious circle of precarious 
contracts. In this context the importance of individual human capital is 
widely recognized by the literature15. In particular, people who are in a 
temporary/precarious status of employment risk will not obtain a permanent 
job if they do not have a satisfactory level of education and/or if during the 
precarious period they do not acquire the stock of knowledge/competencies 
                                                 
15 . See E.C., 2004;  Gagliarducci S., 2004; Origo F., Samek M., Zanzottera C., 2004. 
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necessary to escape from it. Consequently, if precarious jobs are associated 
with low wages and16 little opportunity to accumulate human capital17, they 
may cause an erosion of workers’ competencies and generate a “precarious 
job - low human capital” vicious circle. On the contrary, if the workers 
involved with precarious employment have a high level of education, and if 
temporary jobs offer them an opportunity to improve their competencies 
through training activities and experience, we can expect a faster transition 
to permanent employment. In actual fact, the theoretical model presented in 
section 2 shows that individual human capital is not the only (the main?) 
variable affecting this kind of labour market transitions. In this theoretical 
framework, this paper attempts to analyse the individual speed of transition 
to permanent employment in the Italian regional labour markets, focusing 
on the role of human capital accumulation and labour markets conditions at 
local level. To this aim I analysed the data of the European Community 
Household Panel, which allows following a sample of individuals for 8 
years (1994-2001) and estimating a variety of duration models. In this 
survey the main question on “precariousness” is PE0024: “What type of 
employment contract do you have in your main job18?” Respondents are 
asked to select the type of contract among the following categories:  (1) 
Permanent employment; (2) Fixed-term or short term contract; (3) Casual 
work with no contract; (4) Some other working arrangement. In this case I 
                                                 
16 . Sometimes low wages are associated with on-the-job training. This occurs when 
workers pay for their training, in order to obtain higher human capital, higher productivity 
and so higher wages in the future. 
17 . Thus if precarious jobs have the same characteristics of the Snower’s  “bad jobs” 
(Snower, 1996). 
18 . Obviously, this question is applicable only for dependent employment. 
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could consider category 2 and category 3 “temporary/precarious jobs”, 
(category 4 includes only few observations and I dropped them from the 
analysis). Moreover, due to the absence of the PE0024 question in the first 
wave (1994), I had to exclude this wave from the sample. In the first step of 
the analysis I studied the transition processes between three alternatives 
employment statuses (precarious employment, unemployment, non-
participating labour forces (16-65 years old) towards permanent 
employment. In the second step I concentrated my attention on the 
precarious employees and I analysed the intensity of transition from 
temporary employment to permanent employment. 
 
4. The econometric model  
The most common specifications19 of the hazard rate are adequate when 
the spell length is measured in continuous time, e.g. when duration is 
measured in days or in weeks. On the contrary, my analysis is based on a 
“year to year” transition and the unit of measurement of time (1 wave = 1 
year) is, without doubt, discrete. Then, in this paper, two different discrete-
time formulations of the proportional hazard rate model are estimated: 
Model 1: Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) model (see equation [1] below); and 
Model 2: Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) model incorporating a Gamma 
distribution to summarize unobserved individual heterogeneity (see equation 
[2] below), as proposed by Meyer20. 
Notice that unobserved heterogeneity among individuals is a crucial issue 
for most economic and econometric analysis. In general, when we have a 
                                                 
19 . See, for example, Cox, 1972. 
20 .  Meyer, 1990. 
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population of individuals and we observe a correlation between a 
“treatment” (temporary contract or not) and an “outcome” (permanent 
contract or not) we cannot conclude that this correlation implies causation 
if we do not take into account individual heterogeneity. In effect, people 
who get/accept a temporary contract might be heterogeneous from both 
permanent employees and unemployed individuals. They could be younger, 
more or less capable, characterized by a different risk aversion, by a 
different preference for leisure, etc. In short, they could have some 
(unobservable) individual characteristics that make them more/less likely to 
get a permanent job, apart from the influence of their experience as 
temporary workers. In other words, due to the presence of unobservable 
characteristics at the same time affecting both the probability of being a 
temporary worker and the subsequent employment chances, we cannot infer 
the effect of the “treatment” on the outcome because we do not observe the 
counterfactual evidence, i.e. what would have happened to the “outcome” in 
the absence of the “treatment”. Suitable methods to handle this problem are 
illustrated by a wide literature21. In this paper, following Meyer, unobserved 
heterogeneity, v, is assumed to be multiplicative in specification [2] (see 
below) and to be Gamma distributed22 with expectation E(v)=1, and a 
constant variance, V(v)=σ2. The hazard rates for both models, θkj, are the 
discrete time counterpart of the hazard rates for the underlying continuous 
time proportional hazard models. Specifically, the discrete time hazard rates 
measure the (conditional) probability for individual i that the transition to 
                                                 
21 . For a review of  the literature, see Ichino, 2002. 
22 . This method is widely utilized in survival analysis empirical models (see Pozzoli D., 
2005). It gets consistent estimates of parameters if the underlined hypotheses are respected. 
  11
state j (permanent employment) occurs during period (wave) ti, provided 
that the same individual was in state k (out of labour forces, unemployment 
or temporary employment) until the start of that period (wave), and are 
defined by: 
Model 1:      ( )( ) ( )[ ]kjiikjikjiikjikj tXtexpexptXt βγβθ '()(1;| +−−=                  [1]                                        
Model 2:      ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]vlogtXtexpexpvtXt kjiikjikjiikjikj ++−−= βγβθ '()(1;;|     [2]                                        
where Xikj is a vector of covariates summarizing observed differences 
between individuals (either fixed or time-varying), β is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated, and ( )ikj tγ  is a function describing duration 
dependence in the hazard rate. In effect, the resulting parameters of the 
baseline hazard ( )ikj tγ  may be specified by a parametric function of 
duration, however, with a suitable definition of the covariates, models with 
a fully non-parametric specification for duration dependence can be 
estimated23.   
 
5. Model estimation 
In the first step of this analysis I considered a sample of people who 
entered the panel as precarious employees, unemployed, non-participating  
labour forces, aged 16-65, and I studied their transition processes to 
permanent employment. At this stage of the analysis I had to limit the 
covariates24 to those applicable to all the individuals in this sample25: (1) 
                                                 
23 . The Prentice and Gloeckler approach is similar to Cox’s partial likelihood technique 
(Cox, 1972, 1975). Both estimators make no assumption about the baseline hazard. The 
log-likelihood function of model 2 is reported in Meyer, 1990. 
24 . For a more detailed description of the variables, see Appendix B. 
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starting condition in the labour market, (2) human capital characteristics, 
such as educational level and health status26, (3) individual characteristics, 
such as gender, age, marital status, “migration trajectory”27, (4) local labour 
market characteristics, such as a territorial dummy and the employment rate 
at regional level. In the second step of the analysis, confining the estimates 
to temporary employees, I could utilize some job related covariates. In 
particular I could: (1) integrate the definition of individual human capital by 
considering training activities and experience acquired on the job, (2) 
include in the estimates some information about the type of job, such as full 
time/part time contract, total length of the temporary contract, public/private 
sector of activity, size of the firm, type of occupation, main activity of the 
firm, etc. Before proceeding to more complicated models, I estimated the 
Kaplan-Meier curves for the categorical predictors. This will provide 
insight into the shape of the survival function for each group and, as far as 
the log-rank test of equality across strata are concerned, it allows deciding 
whether or not to include the predictor in the final model. Besides the 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates can be considered as a “spurious” measure 
of the effect of time on the probability of exit towards permanent 
                                                                                                                            
25 . At this stage of the analysis, for most individuals in the sample,  I have no information 
about the demand-side of the labour market.  In this case, following some other empirical 
contributions on labour markets transition processes (see, e.g.,  Hernanz, Origo, Samek, 
Toharia, 2004, Barbieri, Sestito, 2004) I preferred to concentrate my attention on the 
supply-side characteristics. 
26 . As we can state that firms prefer to invest in more “reliable” workers, with less 
probability of absenteeism, “health” could be included within a wide definition of 
individual “human capital” (Croce, Ghignoni 2004). 
27 . For details see Appendix B. 
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employment28. As usual29 I included a predictor in the final model if its log-
rank test has a p-value of 0.2  or less30.  
 
6.1. The intensity of transition towards permanent employment: 
temporary employees, unemployed and non-participating labour forces 
In this section, in order to have a better understanding of the transition 
processes to stable employment in the Italian regional labour markets, I 
estimated equation [1] (exogeneity of initial status) and equation [2] 
(endogeneity of initial status) on a sample of people who entered the panel 
as temporary workers, unemployed or non-participating labour forces (aged 
16-65), by disaggregating the analysis across geographical areas (Centre-
North and “Mezzogiorno”). The main results are reported in tab. 1 (without 
unobservable heterogeneity) and in tab. 2 (with unobservable 
heterogeneity). 
Overall31 the estimates indicate that temporary workers enter permanent 
employment faster than unemployed and inactive people in both 
geographical areas (tab. 1), even after controlling for unobservable 
heterogeneity (tab. 2). Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting that the 
estimated coefficients for the “starting conditions” dummies are statistically 
lower in tab. 2 than in tab. 1 (at least for central and northern regions). This 
                                                 
28 .  The graphics of the estimated KM survival function can be requested to the author. 
29 . See Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez, 2004. 
30 . I used this elimination scheme because all the predictors in the selected dataset are 
variables that could be relevant to the model, but if the predictor has a p-value greater than 
0.2 in a univariate analysis it is highly unlikely that it will contribute at all in a model that 
includes other predictors. The results of this kind of analysis may be requested to the 
author. 
31 . Note that some estimated coefficients for Italy as a whole are biased because of area-
variability. 
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could mean that some unobservable individual characteristics influencing 
the probability of being a temporary worker (instead of being unemployed 
or inactive) are also likely to increase the probability of getting a stable job. 
A very low educational level (compulsory education or lower, with respect 
to tertiary education) has a significantly negative effect on the intensity of 
transition to permanent employment in Italy as a whole (tab. 1) or at least in 
the southern regions (tab. 2). On the other hand, good health conditions 
seem to improve the chances of employment only in the Mezzogiorno. 
 
Tab. 1 –Transition rates to permanent employment (precarious 
employees, unemployed, non-participating labour forces, 16-65) 
(1) PGM hazard model without unobserved heterogeneity by 
geographical areas, (Bernoulli distribution, cloglog link) 
Italy* Centre-North** South-Islands*** 
Covariates Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
Constant -2.0359 -19.10 0.000 -2.0093 -15.29 0.000 -3.0357 -15.13 0.000 
Starting condition (Precarious employees) 
Unemployed -3.2928 -42.86 0.000 -3.5398 -24.90 0.000 -2.9826 -32.41 0.000 
Non-participating  L.F.  
(aged 16-65) -4.1800 -69.89 0.000 -4.3708 -50.21 0.000 -3.8406 -46.38 0.000 
Human capital 
Educational level  
(Tertiary education)  
Upper Secondary Education 0.0221 0.88 0.379 0.0537 1.61 0.107 0.0251 0.65 0.517 
Compulsory education or lower -0.3447 -14.53 0.000 -0.1327 -4.26 0.000 -0.6596 -17.82 0.000 
Good health  conditions (Bad) 0.2534 0.62 0.533 -0.1014 -1.56 0.119 0.1022 1.95 0.051 
Individual characteristics 
Male  (Female) 0.0642 4.33 0.000 -0.4362 -1.70 0.089 0.1022 5.60 0.000 
Married (Other) 0.0867 4.71 0.000 0.0186 0.84 0.402 0.2141 6.40 0.000 
Age 0.1081 20.26 0.000 0.1104 16.60 0.000 0.1359 14.42 0.000 
Age2 -0.0013 -20.62 0.000 -0.0015 -18.13 0.000 -0.0014 -15.13 0.000 
“Mobility” (“Immobility”) 0.1115 5.66 0.000 0.1675 7.33 0.000 -0.0007 -0.02 0.985 
Labour markets conditions 
South/Islands (Centre-North) -0.3480 -10.44 0.000 -   -   
Regional employment rate 0.0064 3.62 0.000 0.0116 4.56 0.000 0.0001 0.02 0.981 
*Log likelihood (-0.5*Deviance) = -24831.773; Cf. log likelihood for intercept-only model (Model 0) 
= -42108.474;  Chi-squared statistic for Model (1) vs. Model (0) = 34553.402;  Prob. > chi2(12) = 0 
**Log likelihood (-0.5*Deviance) = -14309.562; Cf. log likelihood for intercept-only model (Model 
0) = -23981.495; Chi-squared statistic for Model (1) vs. Model (0) = 19343.867; Prob. > chi2(11) = 0 
***Log likelihood (-0.5*Deviance) = -10183.597; Cf. log likelihood for intercept-only model (Model 
0) = -17402.889; Chi-squared statistic for Model (1) vs. Model (0) = 14438.584; Prob. > chi2(11) = 0 
 Tab. 2 – Transition rates to permanent employment (precarious employees, unemployed, non-participating labour 
forces, 16-65); (2) PGM hazard model with Gamma distributed unobserved heterogeneity by geographical areas 
Italy* Centre-North** South-Islands*** 
Covariates Coef. H. ratio t P>|t| Coef. H. ratio t P>|t| Coef. H. ratio t P>|t| 
Constant -2.5893 - -46.86 0.000 -2.5571 - -18.58 0.000 -3.5606 - -9.71 0.000
Starting condition (Precarious employees) 
Unemployed -2.9527 0.0522 -19.59 0.000 -2.6895 0.0679 -12.95 0.000 -2.6136 0.0732 -14.60 0.000
Non-participating  L.F. (16-65) -3.9305 0.0196 -31.65 0.000 -4.1396 0.0159 -22.83 0.000 -3.5846 0.0277 -20.52 0.000
Human capital 
Educational level (Tertiary education) 
Upper Secondary Education 0.0129 1.0129 0.31 0.758 0.0297 1.0302 0.52 0.605 -0.0048 0.9952 -0.07 0.947
Compulsory education or lower -0.2141 0.8072 -5.18 0.000 -0.0513 0.9499 -0.89 0.371 -0.4521 0.6363 -6.05 0.000
Good health  conditions (Bad) 0.1387 1.1488 1.82 0.068 -0.0556 0.9459 -0.53 0.597 0.2238 1.2508 2.32 0.020
Individual characteristics 
Male  (Female) 0.0177 1.0179 0.60 0.547 -0.0742 0.9285 -1.42 0.157 0.0621 1.0641 1.81 0.071
Married (Other) 0.0631 1.0651 2.03 0.042 0.0313 1.0318 0.76 0.446 0.2237 1.2508 3.34 0.001
Age 0.0483 1.0495 32.40 0.000 0.0485 1.0497 6.15 0.000 0.0764 1.0794 4.56 0.000
Age2 -0.0006 0.9993 -29.07 0.000 -0.0007 0.9992 -7.37 0.000 -0.0008 0.9991 -4.20 0.000
“Mobility” (“Immobility”) 0.1278 1.1363 3.42 0.000 0.1357 1.1453 3.18 0.001 0.0425 1.0435 0.53 0.595
Labour markets conditions 
South/Islands (Centre-North) -0.3369 0.7140 -14.97 0.000 - - - - - - - - 
Regional employment rate 0.0076 1.0076 2.14 0.032 0.0140 1.0141 2.78 0.005 0.0010 1.0010 0.21 0.834
*Likelihood ratio statistic for testing models (1) vs (2) = 19295.199; Prob. test statistic > chi2(1) = 0 
**Likelihood ratio statistic for testing models (1) vs (2) = 9219.6407; Prob. test statistic > chi2(1) = 0 
***Likelihood ratio statistic for testing models (1) vs (2) = 9359.1496; Prob. test statistic > chi2(1) = 0 
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Being a male and being married has a sizable positive impact upon the 
transition process to stable employment, especially in southern regions (tab. 
1 and tab. 2). Age has a significantly positive, albeit non linear (as shown by 
the age2 variable), impact on the transition process in both geographical 
areas. The individuals who have been living in the same region since birth, 
generally have a significantly lower probability of entering permanent 
employment rather than “mobile” people32. Anyway this is not true for 
people who lived in the southern regions at the time of the interview. This 
could mean that a certain degree of territorial mobility, allowing people to 
make a lot of different experiences, might improve the intensity of transition 
toward a stable job, but not if the living region is a southern one. The 
territorial dummy shows a clearly lower probability of getting a stable job 
for southern workers. Nevertheless, regional employment rates have a 
significantly positive effect on the transition processes towards permanent 
employment only in the central and northern regions (tab. 1 and tab. 2) and 
not in the southern ones. Overall, the transition probability in the southern 
regions appears to be more responsive to the personal characteristics (such 
as human capital) and to the role of the individual within the family (such as 
gender and marital status) rather than in the Centre-North, whereas local 
labour market conditions appear not to be very important. On the contrary, 
in the central and northern regions local employment rates have a substantial 
effect on the employment opportunities of the individuals. These results are 
consistent with the theoretical model presented in section 2 and they are 
                                                 
32 . That is, people with some experiences of territorial mobility before the interview; see 
Appendix B for details. 
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substantially confirmed by the results of the analysis carried out in the next 
section. 
 
6.2. The intensity of transition of temporary employees towards 
permanent employment 
In this section I analyse the temporary workers’ transition towards 
permanent employment. As mentioned above to restrict the sample to 
temporary employees allows utilizing some job related covariates. In 
particular I could introduce in the model training activities, experience on 
the job and some information about the type of temporary job. Moreover, if 
all individuals in the sample are temporary workers there should no longer 
be any problems of “unobservables” and I could estimate a model without 
unobserved heterogeneity. However individual heterogeneity could also 
depend on individual characteristics not correlated to the employment 
status. For this reason I estimated two different models (with and without 
unobserved heterogeneity) in this section as well. 
The definition of “training” used in the estimated model deserves some 
explanations. The main question on “training participation” in the ECHP is 
as follows: “Have you been in education or training since January last 
year?” (PT001).  On the basis of a positive answer the individual is asked to 
report additional information (“Which kind of course(s) was it?”, PT002)  
that allows to distinguish between “general education” and “vocational 
training”. Starting from 1995, respondents who have been in vocational 
education or training are asked to select the type of training received 
(PT012) among the following categories: (a) Third level qualification, such 
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as technical college; (b) Specific vocational training at a vocational school 
or college; (c) Specific vocational training within a system providing both 
work experience and a complementary instruction elsewhere; (d) Specific 
vocational training in a working environment; (e) Other. Following 
Bassanini, Brunello (2003); Lowenstein, Spletzer (1998,1998) and OECD 
(2003), I used the distinction between off-site and workplace training to 
proxy the distinction between general and firm-specific training. Assuming 
that all off-site training33 is at least partly general, I treated category a, b and 
c as “general training” and category d as “firm-specific training”34. 
ECHP survey also provides complete information on (general and 
specific) work experience, working conditions in the actual job, working 
conditions in the previous job and on the eventual unemployment 
experiences prior to the current job, for each individual. Among these 
variables I included in the model only the variables statistically significant 
from the point of view of the previous univariate analysis.  
It is worth to notice that the empirical literature on High Performance 
Work Organisations (HPWOs, Osterman, 2000) shows that the adoption of 
HPWO practices35 is associated with a lower rate of precariousness and, 
coeteris paribus, with a higher probability of transition toward stable 
employment. Unluckily the ECHP does not provide information about work 
organization in the firms. However, it has been argued that the adoption of 
                                                 
33 . Actually, while categories a and b refer unambiguously to off-site training course, 
category c refers to courses partly taken off-site and partly received in the workplace. 
Nevertheless it is usual in literature to consider category c as general training (see 
Bassanini, Brunello, 2003). On the other hand category d refers to workplace training only. 
34 . In the category “other” there are very few observations and I neglected them. 
35 . i.e. self-managed teams, Total Quality Management, Quality Circles, and Job Rotation. 
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HPWOs appears to be most prevalent in large establishments, in the 
manufacturing sector and in the public sector36. In this case, to control the 
estimates for the size of the firms and the sector of activity could be a 
suitable method to handle this problem. 
The results have been disaggregated by geographical area and are 
summarized in tab. 3 (without unobserved heterogeneity) and in tab. 4 (with 
unobserved heterogeneity). Regarding the educational level, I can state that 
temporary workers with a compulsory educational level (or lower) have a 
significantly lower probability of transition towards permanent employment, 
rather than graduates in both regions. Furthermore, in the southern regions 
a tertiary education degree seems to provide better chances to succeed than 
an upper secondary level of education (tables 3 and 4). On the other hand, 
temporary workers who have been in general training appear to have, 
coeteris paribus, worse chances of entering into stable employment than 
people who did specific training and people who have not been in training at 
all. Possibly this is because since the very beginning those who did general 
training were more interested to improve their own human capital rather 
than working for a long period for the same employer. Alternatively, we 
could state that people choice to dedicate more time to general training 
activities when they expect their temporary contracts not to be confirmed. 
Moreover, firms should offer firm-specific training mainly to workers they 
want to retain. In any case, specific training appears to be a key variable in 
determining a faster transition from a temporary job to a stable job in both 
                                                 
36 . See Bauer, 2004 and Kalleberg, 2003. 
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geographical areas37. The intensity of transition to stable jobs, in both 
regions, is positively correlated with specific on the job experience, whereas 
good health conditions seem to positively influence the occupational 
chances of temporary workers only in the southern regions. Turning to 
individual characteristics, the temporary workers’ age has a positive (albeit 
decreasing) effect on the probability of getting a stable job both in the 
Centre-North and in the Mezzogiorno. Being a male and being married in 
the South clearly increases the probability to get a permanent job, while 
neither gender nor marital status seems to be so relevant in the northern and 
central regions. As a final note, I would like to mention the influence on the 
transition process towards permanent employment of job characteristics and 
labour markets conditions. In this context the economic sector, the firm’s 
size and the kind of occupation would play a crucial role. In actual fact the 
estimated probability of transition to a stable job is highest for temporary 
workers in public sector, in manufacturing industries and in big/medium 
firms, in both regions.  Furthermore, temporary workers in elementary 
occupation are less likely to enter into stable employment than other 
workers, in both northern and southern regions. On the contrary regional 
employment rates would have a substantial positive effect on transition 
probability only in the northern regions. Overall, even if the sample is 
restricted to temporary employees, the estimates would nonetheless confirm 
the main result of previous analysis. 
                                                 
37 . Notwithstanding the positive effects of human capital accumulation on the southern 
workers’ occupational chances, Italian labour markets are characterised by the presence of 
territorial differentials in the educational levels, which strongly penalize the southern 
regions (Frey, Ghignoni, 2002). Furthermore, southern firms would offer less training than 
northern ones; see Croce, Ghignoni, 2004. 
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Tab. 3 –Transition rates to permanent employment  
(precarious employees only) 
(1) PGM hazard model without unobserved heterogeneity by 
geographical areas, (Bernoulli distribution, cloglog link) 
Italy* Centre-North** South-Islands*** 
Covariates Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
Constant -1.5625 -7.53 0.000 -1.9984 -7.80 0.000 -1.5705 -3.97 0.000 
Human capital 
Educational level  
(Tertiary education)  
Upper Secondary Education 0.0495 1.03 0.305 0.1051 1.44 0.151 -0.1211 -1.92 0.055 
Compulsory education or lower -0.1992 -4.35 0.000 -0.3173 -4.14 0.000 -0.2680 -4.50 0.000 
Training on the job (no training)  
General training -0.1334 -3.75 0.000 -0.091 -3.29 0.001 -0.2604 -3.49 0.000 
Specific training 0.3374 5.05 0.000 0.3610 4.82 0.000 0.3725 2.58 0.010 
Specific on the job experience  0.0418 15.77 0.000 0.0411 12.40 0.000 0.0427 9.45 0.000 
Good health  conditions (Bad) 0.0194 0.92 0.359 0.1005 0.23 0.820 0.0750 2.46 0.014 
Individual characteristics 
Male  (Female) 0.1722 5.85 0.000 0.0686 1.31 0.190 0.0686 6.31 0.000 
Married (Other) 0.0912 2.60 0.009 0.0475 1.12 0.262 0.1699 2.69 0.007 
Age 0.0415 3.96 0.000 0.0708 5.38 0.000 0.0264 5.40 0.000 
Age2 -0.0007 -5.86 0.000 -0.0012 -7.45 0.000 -0.0004 -1.94 0.052 
“Mobility” (“Immobility”) 0.1292 3.28 0.001 0.2334 5.08 0.000 0.1062 1.36 0.175 
Job characteristics 
Elementary occupations (other) -0.0716 -11.41 0.000 -0.0699 -11.00 0.000 -0.1187 -5.57 0.000 
Public sector (Private sector) 0.8590 24.45 0.000 0.6682 14.47 0.000 1.0760 19.69 0.000 
Big and medium firms  
(Small firms) 0.7570 24.11 0.000 0.7564 19.23 0.000 0.7662 14.26 0.000 
Manufacturing industries (other) 0.5821 17.03 0.000 0.5209 12.88 0.000 0.6731 10.38 0.000 
Labour markets conditions 
South/Islands (Centre-North) -0.2466 -3.82 0.000 - - - - - - 
Regional employment rate 0.4305 11.24 0.000 0.0579 11.11 0.000 0.0004 0.08 0.939 
* Log likelihood (-0.5*Deviance) = -5987.1834;  Cf. log likelihood for intercept-only model (Model 
0) = -7407.7531; Chi-squared statistic for Model (1) vs. Model (0) = 2841.1395;  Prob. > chi2(17) = 0 
** Log likelihood (-0.5*Deviance) = -3597.7857;  Cf. log likelihood for intercept-only model (Model 
0) = -4304.9396; Chi-squared statistic for Model (1) vs. Model (0) = 1414.3078; Prob.> chi2(16) = 0 
*** Log likelihood (-0.5*Deviance) = -2311.979; Cf. log likelihood for intercept-only model (Model 
0) = -3065.1216;  Chi-squared statistic for Model (1) vs. Model (0) = 1506.2852; Prob. > chi2(16) = 0 
 
The intensity of transition towards permanent employment would be 
more influenced by the workers’ individual characteristics  (such as human 
capital and individual position within the family) in the southern  regions 
rather  than in the Centre-North,  while local labour market conditions 
would not be significant in the Mezzogiorno. 
 Tab. 4 – Transition rates to permanent employment (precarious employees only); (2) PGM hazard model with Gamma 
distributed unobserved heterogeneity by geographical areas 
Italy* Centre-North** South-Islands*** 
Covariates Coef. Hazard ratio t P>|t| Coef. Hazard ratio t P>|t| Coef. Hazard ratio t P>|t| 
Constant -2.1512 0.1163 -6.99 0.000 -1.934 0.1446 -5.34 0.000 -2.1303 0.1188 -9.75 0.000 
Educational level (Tertiary education)  
Upper Secondary Education 0.0780 1.0811 0.93 0.350 0.0101 1.0101 0.12 0.901 -0.0585 0.9432 -2.42 0.016 
Compulsory education or lower -0.1114 0.8946 -7.26 0.000 -0.1286 0.8793 -3.69 0.000 -0.2181 0.8040 -10.01 0.000 
Training on the job (no training)  
General training -0.1747 0.8397 -3.59 0.000 -0.0929 0.9113 -5.80 0.000 -0.1295 0.8785 -3.58 0.000 
Specific training 0.0883 1.0923 3.12 0.000 0.0947 1.0993 4.09 0.000 0.1015 1.1068 4.65 0.000 
Specific on the job experience 0.0228 1.0231 6.40 0.000 0.0229 1.0232 5.32 0.000 0.0248 1.0251 4.62 0.000 
Good health  conditions (Bad) 0.0316 1.0321 0.28 0.777 0.0389 1.0397 0.27 0.786 0.1794 1.1965 2.03 0.042 
Male  (Female) 0.0850 1.0887 1.93 0.054 0.0839 1.0875 1.69 0.091 0.0113 1.0114 4.17 0.000 
Married (Other) 0.0817 1.0851 3.46 0.000 0.0721 1.0748 1.29 0.196 0.0764 1.0794 4.01 0.000 
Age 0.0281 1.0285 3.69 0.000 0.0452 1.0462 2.82 0.005 0.0229 1.0232 7.44 0.000 
Age2 -0.0005 0.9995 -2.23 0.026 -0.0008 0.9992 -4.07 0.000 -0.0003 0.9997 -7.92 0.000 
“Mobility” (“Immobility”) 0.0654 1.0676 3.28 0.000 0.1351 1.1446 2.29 0.022 0.0352 1.0358 0.35 0.727 
Elementary occupations (other) -0.0675 0.9347 -7.93 0.000 -0.1207 0.8863 -6.29 0.000 -0.0304 0.9700 -6.30 0.000 
Public sector (Private sector) 0.5699 1.7681 12.17 0.000 0.4168 1.5198 7.09 0.000 0.7355 2.0865 10.01 0.000 
Big and medium firms (Small firms) 0.4152 1.5147 10.52 0.000 0.4233 1.5270 8.60 0.000 0.4128 1.5110 6.32 0.000 
Manufacturing industries (other) 0.4396 1.5521 7.96 0.000 0.3606 1.4342 6.68 0.000 0.5604 1.7514 6.68 0.000 
South/Islands (Centre-North) -0.1232 0.8841 -5.44 0.000 - - - - - - - - 
Regional employment rate 0.1239 1.1319 10.07 0.000 0.1908 1.2102 11.01 0.000 0.0009 1.0009 0.13 0.898 
* Likelihood ratio statistic for testing models (1) vs (2) = -408.297; Prob. test statistic > chi2(1) = 0; ** Likelihood ratio statistic for testing models (1) vs (2) = -
374.89995; Prob. test statistic > chi2(1) = 0; *** Likelihood ratio statistic for testing models (1) vs (2) = -128.79413; Prob. test statistic > chi2(1) = 0 
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On the contrary, in the central and northern regions local employment 
rates would have a strong and significantly positive effect on the intensity of 
transition, while individual characteristics seems not to be very important. 
These empirical results seem to confirm the implications of the 
theoretical model presented in section 2 and they could also be interpreted 
in the theoretical framework of Thurow’s queues theory, revised by 
Tarantelli. In effect, as Tarantelli38 said, we observe a significantly 
increasing proportion of young workers, aged 20-30, “in transit” in the 
“lower external labour market” (characterised by high turnover rates and 
low qualification levels). If these workers do not reach the qualification 
level necessary to enter at least the “lower internal labour market” 
(characterised by low turnover rates and high qualification levels) they 
could be “trapped” in the lower external labour market. In this context 
human capital accumulation would have a strong influence on the 
probability of transition towards stable employment39.  However we have to 
take into account the role of labour demand as well. With this purpose in 
mind, following Tarantelli and Thurow, we could imagine a “queue” of 
workers who apply for a (permanent) job subdivided according to increasing 
training costs40 (see graph. 1). In both situations depicted in graphic 1: (a) 
the first worker has the lowest training cost, that is the highest educational 
level; and (b) the last worker has the highest training cost, that is the lowest 
educational level. Obviously, m>n, because in southern region the labour 
demand is lower and the “queue”  is longer. We could also suppose that 
                                                 
38 . Tarantelli, 1986. 
39 . And we saw from the previous empirical analysis that it is true, under certain 
conditions. 
40 . Note that training costs are generally lower for better educated individuals.  
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firms choose the worker to hire (with a permanent contract) on the basis of 
these training costs41: “Basically, employers use background 
characteristics42 to indicate expected training costs and then attempt to rank 
and hire their potential labour force from those with the lowest training 
costs to those with the highest training costs” (Thurow, 1975). In this 
theoretical framework, the higher the labour demand, the smaller would be 
the influence of individual human capital on the speed of transition towards 
permanent employment, and vice versa. This means that: (a) in the regional 
labour markets in which the “queue” is longer (South), the worst - highest 
cost - workers could hardly get a stable job and, in this case, education 
matters; (b) in the regional labour markets in which the “queue” is shorter 
(Centre-North), most of workers have a high probability of entering into 
permanent employment, almost irrespectively of their position in the queue, 
which is based on their individual level of education. 
The results of my empirical analysis are consistent with this kind of 
assertion. In actual fact, in the labour markets of the southern regions 
education seems to have a great influence on the transition probability 
between a precarious job toward a stable one. On the other hand, in the 
central and northern regions, in which the labour demand is higher, 
education has not a decisive role on the transition processes toward 
permanent employment. These results are also consistent with the 
implications of the theoretical model presented in section 2. The main 
innovation of this model, with respect to the interpretation of Tarantelli and 
Thurow, is the explicit consideration of the effect of unemployment on new 
                                                 
41 . Thurow, 1975, 1982; Lindbeck, Snower, 1988; Weiss, 1990. 
42 . Such as education, innate abilities, age, sex, personal habits, etc. 
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entrants’ wages. In this case, a high level of unemployment at local level, by 
exerting a pressure on the wages of the new entrants, would contribute to 
increase the threshold R, that is the minimum level of education for 
investment in training to be profitable for the firm. Then, the importance of 
a high level of education in determining the transition process toward a 
stable job increases. 
 
Graph. 1 – Training costs and “queues” for a stable job in the Italian 
regional labour markets 
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6. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
This paper deals with the terms of the “contractual exchange” between 
more employment and more precariousness in the Italian regional labour 
markets, and tries to answer the question: how long does it take to get a 
stable job in different Italian regions? To this end, I developed a theoretical 
model in which the “speed” of transition between a precarious job towards a 
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stable one depend on individual human capital and unemployment rate at 
local level. Afterward I applied a discrete time proportional hazard model 
with Gamma distributed unobserved heterogeneity to the data of the 
European Community Household Panel, for the period 1995-2001, focusing 
on the important role of individual human capital and local conditions of the 
labour markets.  
The results show that, even after controlling for unobservable individual 
characteristics which possibly affect both the initial condition and the 
subsequent transition probabilities, temporary workers are characterized by 
higher intensity of transition towards permanent employment compared 
with both unemployed and inactive people. Anyway, by disaggregating the 
analysis across “macro-regions” and even by including in the sample only 
the precarious workers, some important regional differences emerged. In 
effect, as expected, the probability of getting a stable job is generally lower 
for southern workers, for female workers and for individuals who do not 
attain a high level of human capital, both at school and on the job. At the 
same time I generally found a positive relationship between the local 
employment rate and the probability of entering into permanent 
employment. Nevertheless, in different regions the variables involved in the 
estimated models would influence labour market transitions in a very 
different way. In particular, the local employment rate seems to be a key 
variable in determining the transition from a temporary job to a stable job in 
the central and northern regions, whereas the individual characteristics of 
temporary workers (such as human capital and the individual position 
within the family) have a stronger influence on transition processes in the 
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southern regions. These empirical results, which could also be interpreted in 
the light of Tarantelli/Thurow’s queues theory, are consistent with my 
theoretical model, in which I explicitly take into account the negative 
influence of a high level of local unemployment on the wages of the new 
entrants. In any case it seems possible to state that the influence of 
education on the intensity of transition towards a stable job is significant if 
labour demand is low. On the contrary, if labour demand is high, most of 
workers, more or less educated, have a high probability of getting a stable 
job. In this context temporary jobs would serve as “stepping stones” to enter 
stable employment in case of high labour demand, whereas they risk to be 
“dead-end jobs” in case of low labour demand, aside from the potential 
positive effect of individual human capital accumulation.  
 It is possible to deduce from these results some policy indications. To 
begin with, if we want the temporary contracts not to be the first step of a 
vicious circle of precarious contracts, some development and jobs creation’s 
policies at local level are necessary. Secondly, heterogeneous human capital 
(and in particular, firm-specific training) is relevant to improve the intensity 
of transition toward stable employment. Then, should we invest in firm-
specific training? Probably we should. Anyway, it is well known that firms 
offer (general and specific) training to workers with a high level of 
education43. In this case labour market policies based on lifelong learning 
for all, for always, should be preferred.   
 
                                                 
43 . See Croce, Ghignoni, 2004. 
  28
Appendix  - Data and variables description  
 The data used for the estimations are obtained from the European Community 
Household Panel of Eurostat in relation to the years 1995-2001 (7 waves). For the purpose 
of this analysis the individuals included in the sample have been selected so as to include 
only “precarious employed”, unemployed and inactive people, aged 16-65 (63,693 
individuals). 
 The goal of the analysis is to model time until attainment of a permanent employment 
contract for each individual in the sample. The variable time contains the number of waves 
(years) until getting a stable job and the variable censor indicates whether or not the 
individual get a permanent contract. This variable is built on the basis of PE024 question 
(What type of employment contract do you have in your main job) and takes value 1 for 
permanent employment and value 0 otherwise (fixed term or short term contract, casual 
work with no contract). People with “some other working arrangement” have been dropped 
from the analysis. 
Precarious employees, unemployed and people non-participating in labour forces (aged 
16-65) have been classified on the basis of PE002A question (Main activity status – self-
defined) which include the following categories: normally working, unemployed, inactive. 
“Normally working” people have been considered “precarious/temporary employed” if 
their answer to question PE024 is either fixed term/short term contract or casual work with 
no contract. 
Educational level: dummies variables built on the basis of question PT022 (Highest level 
of general or higher education completed) as follows (ref. category: Tertiary education): 
Upper secondary degree  


otherwise   0
3) (ISCED   education   level    secondaryof     stage   Second1
 
Compulsory educ. or lower


otherwise   0
2)-0 (ISCED  educ.  secondaryof  stage secondthan Less   1
 
Training: dummies variables built on the basis of questions PT001 (Have you been in 
education or training since January last year?), PT002 (Which kind of course(s) was it?) 
that allows  to distinguish between “general education” and “vocational training” and 
PT012 (Type of the vocational education course). Following the most recent literature I 
considered: (1) “general training” or (partly) off-site training: third level qualification 
courses (such as technical college); specific vocational training courses at a vocational 
school or college; specific vocational training courses within a system providing both work 
experience and a complementary instruction elsewhere; (2) “specific training” or workplace 
training: the specific vocational training courses in a working environment. Ref. category: 
no training at all. 
Specific Experience: variable built on the basis of the question PE011 as follows: 
job current of year   starting- survey  the of year   experience  Specific =  
Good health conditions: dummy variable built on the basis of the question PH001 (How is 
your health in general?). The variable has value 1 for: very good, good, fair and value 0 for 
bad, very bad. 
Male: dummy variable built on the basis of the question PD004 (Male=1; female=0). 
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Married: dummy variable built on the basis of the question PD005 (Married=1; 
otherwise=0). 
Age: age of the individual at the time of the survey, question PD003. 
Mobility: dummy variable built on the basis of the question PM001 about individual’s 
“migration trajectory”. “Immobile” people are “born in the country of present residence, 
lived in the same region since birth”, whereas “mobile” people are all the other ones: 
“people born in the country of present residence, lived in a different region within the 
country before coming to this region; people born in the country of present residence, lived 
abroad before coming to this region; people born abroad, still lived in the same foreign 
country before coming to the country of present residence; people born abroad, lived in 
another foreign country before coming to the country of present residence”. 
Elementary occupation: question PE006c (Occupation in current job, i.e. principal 
activity performed), Elementary occupations = 1; other = 0 (Legislators, senior officials and 
managers, Professionals, Technicians and associate professionals, Clerks, Service workers 
and shop and market sales workers, Skilled agricultural and fishery workers, Craft and 
related trades workers, Plant and machine operators and assemblers, Armed forces). 
Public sector: question PE009 (Current job in private or public sector), public sector, 
including para-statal=1, private sector, including non-profit private organisations=0. 
Big and medium firms: question PE008 (Number of regular paid employees in the local 
unit in current job). I considered: (1) small firms, from 0 to 49 employees; (2) medium 
firms, from 50 to 499 employees; (3) big firms, 500 or more employees. The dummy 
variable is medium/big=1, small=0. 
Manufacturing industries: question PE007b (Main activity of the local unit of the 
business or organisation in current job), Manufacture = 1; other = 0. 
Fulltime/part time (temporary) contract: question PE005C (full time =1; part time=0). 
Total length of temporary contract:  question PE0025 recoded as following: 1= less than 
a year; 0 = 1 year or more. 
Existence of an unemployment period of time before the current (temporary) job: 
question PE014, yes=1; no=0. 
These last three variables have been dropped from the final model because they did not 
appear to be significant in the univariate analysis. 
South/Islands: dummy variable built on the basis of the question HG015; South and 
Islands = 1; Centre-North = 0. 
Regional employment rate: variable calculated on ISTAT data (1995-2001) by each 
EUROSTAT regions. 
 
  30
References   
Barbieri G., Sestito P., 2004, “Temporary Workers in Italy: Who Are They and Where They End 
up?”, Working Paper, XIX National Congress of Labour Economics, Modena, 23rd, 24th 
September. 
Bassanini A., Brunello G., 2003, “Is Training More Frequent when Wage Compression is Higher? 
Evidence from the European Community Household Panel”, Working Paper, XVIII National 
Congress of Labour Economics, Messina, 25th, 26th September. 
Bauer T.K., 2004, “High Performance Workplace Practises and Job Satisfaction: Evidence from 
Europe”, IZA Discussion Papers, IZA, Bonn. 
Becker G., 1963, “Investment in human capital: a theoretical analysis”, Journal of  Political 
Economy, 70, 5. 
Biagi M., 2001, Towards a European Model of Industrial Relations?, Kluwer Law International. 
Blanchard O., Landier A., 2001, “The Perverse Effects of Partial Labor Market Reform: Fixed 
Duration Contracts in France”, NBER Working Papers 8219, NBER Inc. 
Booth A., Francesconi M., Frank J., 2000, “Temporary Jobs: Who Gets Them, What Are They Worth, 
and Do They Lead to Anywhere?”, ISER Working Paper, n. 00/54. 
Booth A., Francesconi M., Frank J., 2002, “Temporary jobs: Stepping Stones or Dead Ends?”, 
Economic Journal, 112, 480, pp. 189-213. 
Cox D.R., 1972, “Regression Models and Life-tables (with discussion)”, Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Series B 34, pp.187-220. 
Cox D.R., 1975, “Partial Likelihood”, Biometrica, 62, pp.269-276. 
Cleves M.A., Gould W.W., Gutierrez R.G., 2004, “An Introduction to Survival Analysis Using 
Stata”, Stata Press, College Station Texas. 
Croce G., Ghignoni E., “Training by Firms in Italian Regional Labour Markets: the Effects of 
Education and Unemployment”, Working Paper, Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica “La 
Sapienza”, Rome, n. 66, 2004. 
Erickcek G.A, Houseman S.N., Kalleberg A.L., 2003, “The Role of Temporary Agency Employment 
in Tight Labour Markets”, Industrial & Labor Relations Review, Vol. 57, n. 1, October.  
European Commission, 2004,  Employment in Europe, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, Luxembourg, August. 
Frey L., Ghignoni E., 2002, “Fattori istituzionali, fattori demografici e capitale umano nel 
Mezzogiorno d’Italia”, in Aa. Vv., L’importanza della riforma universitaria in corso in Italia, 
Quaderni di Economia del Lavoro n. 74, Franco Angeli, Milano, pp. 129-169.  
Gagliarducci S., 2004, “What is Really Bad in Temporary Employment?”, Working Paper, XIX 
National Congress of Labour Economics, Modena, 23rd, 24th September. 
Ghignoni E., 2002, “Istruzione e condizioni monetarie e non monetarie di lavoro nel Mezzogiorno”, 
in Aa. Vv., L’importanza della riforma universitaria in corso in Italia, Quaderni di Economia del 
Lavoro n. 74, Franco Angeli, Milano, pp. 169-189.  
Hernanz V., Origo F., Samek E., Toharia L., 2004, “Dreaming of a Stable Job: the Transition of 
Temporary Workers in Italy and Spain”, Working Paper, XIX National Congress of Labour 
Economics, Modena, 23rd, 24th September. 
Ichino, A., 2002, “The Problem of Causality in the Analysis of Educational Choices and Labour 
Market Outcomes”, http://www.iue.it/Personal/Ichino/Welcome.html. 
Kalleberg A.L., 2003, “High Performance Work Organizations: Payoff to Participation?”, Working 
Paper, Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, November. 
Lindbeck A., Snower D.J., 1988, The Insider-Outsider Theory of Employment and Unemployment, 
The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Lindbeck A., Snower D.J., 1990, “Demand- and Supply-Side Policies and Unemployment: Policy 
Implications of the Insider-Outsider Approach”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell 
Publishing, Vol. 92(2), pp.  279-305. 
  31
Lowenstein M., Spletzer J., 1998, “Dividing the Cost and the Return to General Training”, Journal of 
Labour Economics, 16, 142-171. 
Lowenstein M., Spletzer J., 1999, “General and Specific Training: Evidence and Implications”, 
Journal of Human Resources, 34, 710-733. 
Meyer B.D., 1990, “Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells”, Econometrica, Vol. 58, 4, 
July, 757-782. 
Muthoo A, 1999, Bargaining Theory with Applications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Nunziata L., Staffolani S., 2001, “On Short Term Contracts Regulation”, Nuffield College Economica 
Papers, W7, May.  
OECD, 2003, Employment Outlook, Paris. 
Origo F., Samek M., Zanzottera C., 2004, “The Transition of Temporary Workers in the Labour 
market: Is Training Relevant?”, Working Paper, XIX National Congress of Labour Economics, 
Modena, 23rd, 24th September. 
Ostermann P., 2000, “Work Reorganization in an Era of Restructuring: Trends in Diffusion and 
Effects on Employee Welfare”, Industrial and Labor Relation Review, n.1, January.  
Padoa Schioppa F., 1991, Mismatch and Labour mobility, CEPR – STEP, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Pappadà G., 2003, “Precariousness Trap and Learning Processes”, PhD Thesis, University of  Rome, 
“La Sapienza”, Rome. 
Pissarides C.A., 2000, Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.  
Pozzoli, D., 2005, “The Transition to Work for Italian University Graduates: Determinants of the 
Time to Obtain the First Job”, Working Paper, XIX National Congress of Labour Economics, 
Modena, 23rd, 24th September. 
Prentice R., Gloeckler L., 1978, “Regression Analysis of Grouped Survival Data with Application to 
Breast Cancer Data” Biometrica, 34, 57-67. 
Saint-Paul G, 1996, Dual Labour Markets: A Macroeconomic Perspective, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 
Saint Paul G., 2004, “Why are European Countries Diverging in their Unemployment Experience”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, n. 4, Fall, pp.49-68. 
Snower D.J., 1996, “The Low-skill, Bad-job Trap”, Acquiring Skills. Market Failures, their 
Symptoms and Policy Responses, Booth A.L., Snower D.J (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Storrie D., 2002, “Temporary Agency Work in the European Union”, European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Dublin. 
Tarantelli E., 1986, Economia Politica del Lavoro, Utet, Torino. 
Thurow L., 1975, Generating Inequality, The Macmillan Press Ltd, London. 
Thurow L., 1982, Alle origini dell’ineguaglianza. I meccanismi della distribuzione del reddito nella 
società statunitense, Vita e Pensiero, Milan. 
Weiss A., 1990, Efficiency Wages. Model of Unemployment, Layoffs, and Wage Dispersion, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 
Wolff J., 2004, “The Duration of New Job Matches in East and in West Germany”, Working Paper, 
XIX National Congress of Labour Economics, Modena, 23rd, 24th September. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Pubblicato in proprio 
Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica 
Facoltà di Economia 
Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” 
Via del Castro Laurenziano 9 – 00161 Roma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Working Paper del Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica 
Università degli studi di Roma “La Sapienza” 
Via del Castro Laurenziano 9 – 00161 Roma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMITATO SCIENTIFICO 
 
Annamaria Simonazzi (coordinatore) 
Eleonora Cavallaro 
Debora Di Gioacchino 
Maurizio Franzini 
Domenico Mario Nuti 
Enrico Saltari 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I Working Paper vengono pubblicati per favorire la tempestiva 
divulgazione, in forma provvisoria o definitiva, dei risultati delle 
ricerche sulla teoria e la politica economica. La pubblicazione dei lavori 
è soggetta all’approvazione del Comitato Scientifico, sentito il parere di 
due referees. 
 
I Working Paper del  Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica ottemperano 
agli obblighi previsti dall’art. 1 del D.L.: 31.8.45 n. 660 e dal Decreto del 
Presidente della Repubblica 3 maggio 2006 n.252. 
 
